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New materialism, a comparatively recent development in Western intellectual history, has 
broadened the horizon of humanities.1 Fresh engagement with natural science, rereading of earlier 
natural science texts,2 endeavours to extricate the question of matter and materiality from the 
depths of language and discourse have become synonymous with this critical movement.3 While 
a comprehensive account of new materialist scholarship would need to engage with all these 
aspects, my aim in this paper is to critically evaluate a particular aspect of new materialism. Taking 
the question of anthropos as its primary axis, this article would argue that contrary to its 
commitment to forge a posthumanism-inflected non-dualist account of relational ontology, its 
inadequate engagement with the constitutive elements which distinguish the human from the 
nonhuman world results in its being rooted in the same anthropocentric tradition that it had set out 
to dismantle. I intend to demonstrate how new materialist ventures to address the question of 
materiality leaves the anthropocentric distinction of human and non-human uninterrupted, and in 
turn, how this potentially undermines the new materialist call to disarticulate the dualist strata of 
thought.  
This article is divided into two sections. The first one will look into a number of new 
materialist texts and through close analysis unravel how certain new materialist practices subscribe 
to and reinforce the human/nonhuman binary, thereby compromising its claim to subvert 
anthropocentrism and producing what Colebrook calls ‘ultra humanism’ (Colebrook 106) that 
leaves the humanist constitution of these categories intact and instead of scrutinizing the 
metaphysical framework to unfold on what ground this radical separation came into being finds 
solace in ‘fetishizing’ a (material) world beyond the domain of humans (Colebrook 104). Such 
endeavours fail to fully realize the immense potential that the founding principles of new 
materialism entail. Against this backdrop, focusing on the works of Vicki Kirby and what I would 
call Kirby’s ‘radical nonhumanism’, the second section of this article would provide an outline of 
how, when pushed to the extreme, new materialist axiomatics indeed provide concepts that, instead 
of a mere value reversal, dismantles the binary structure from within and render the 
human/nonhuman dualism untenable.   
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New materialism and the topos of human 
 
‘Return to matter’- this maxim contains within itself the general founding principles and 
interventionist implications of the new materialist paradigm (Lemke 91). The emergence of new 
materialism can be traced to two interconnected but distinctly separate intellectual currents.4 
Works produced within the domains of natural science have been decisive in articulating matter in 
a non-essentialist manner. Numerous researches in natural science helped to establish matter as 
poietie, plastic, and unstable, as opposed to the general perception dominant in the Western 
intellectual tradition that considered it passive, inert with no agential capacities of its own.5 On the 
other hand, the development of the new materialism is significantly indebted to a 'minor' tradition 
in Western philosophy that strongly undermines dualist thought by proposing a radical, monist 
philosophy of immanence and arguing for univocity of being (Van der Tuin New Materialism, 
153)  
Before delving further into the analysis of a set of new materialist themes pertaining to our 
current purpose, let us first take a look at the narrative structure of new materialist articulations. 
Being the point of rupture that separates it from its theoretical predecessors, the axiomatic call to 
return to matter implies that there are certain limitations within the dominant critical paradigms, 
and the will to circumvent them is what marks the interventionist force of the new materialism. 
This narrative of return is two-fold. While signifying a turn from the current perspective, implicit 
to the concept of return is what it literally stands for, i.e. moving beyond where we are currently 
at in order to go back to where we once belonged. For new materialism, the call to return bears 
within itself this dual signification. It is a turning away from the discourses that until recently 
dominated the humanities in order to retrieve certain questions which were predominant at a 
particular spatiotemporal coordinate of the history of humanities. But recuperating these questions 
does not mean bringing them back as they were in that earlier period of time. The logic of this 
return narrative reads somewhat like this - the discourse that were until very recently in vogue 
ceased to hold its status because it proved inadequate to address the concerns of our present. As 
already mentioned, this discourse in question is that of linguistic/cultural turn, which has pushed 
us away from the domain of the real by keeping us confined within the realms of abstraction.6 
Despite the veritable body of knowledge the discourses of linguistic turn produced, its obsessive 
investiture in linguistic/cultural constructivism failed to address the question of matter and 
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materiality. Vexation at this de facto erasure of the material world is captured succinctly in Barad’s 
comment that:    
 
Language matters. Discourse matters. Culture matters. There is an important sense in which 
the only thing that does not seem to matter anymore is matter. (Posthumanist 
Performativity 120) 
 
Barad’s statement sums up the general sentiment prevalent in new materialist scholarship 
regarding the adverse effects of the linguistic turn.7 Criticism for their singular attention to the 
processes of signification, interpretation and meaning-making at the cost of rendering matter, the 
‘flesh of the world’8 irrelevant from a critical and political perspective has become one of the 
founding gestures of new materialism.9 But more often than not, this founding gesture remains 
unsubstantiated in a significant number of new materialist projects as a thorough engagement with 
works produced within the linguisticist framework remain uncannily absent.10 Discounting 
rigorous textual analysis, new materialist projects tend to engage in customary negation of the 
linguisticist-culturalist discourses in the form of uncorroborated remarks. Presented thus, the 
cultural/linguistic turn provides the counterpoint against which the new materialist discourses 
validate their claims to novelty. Burnwell notes the absolute necessity of having such a 
counterpoint, something that came before, which provides the backdrop for a recently emerged 
discourse to posit itself as ‘new’ (26-27). It is only by declaring itself to have enacted a definitive 
rupture with its predecessor that a newly evolved position can assert its emergence as the inception 
of a 'new' paradigm, and for new materialism, positions aligned to cultural-linguistic turn (often 
held to be synonymous with ‘postmodern turn’ or ‘poststructuralist turn') function as its 
philosophical precursor from which it claims to have broken away. 
Claire Hemmings deploys the analysis of political rhetoric of philosophical narratives 
geared towards providing a divergent account of the development of feminist thought in the West. 
Since feminist philosophy was one of the chief contributors in forging the material turn and its 
various proponents, Hemming’s discussion of the trajectories of feminist thought sheds light on 
the structural constitution of new materialism. The singularity of Hemmings’ work lies in her 
attempt to trace the evolution of feminist theory over the past few decades through the lens of the 
various narrative schemas that different feminist positions deployed to provide a general account 
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of their development and their relation to their intellectual past. Hemmings divides the journey of 
feminist theory in terms of three narrative structures – progress narrative, loss narrative, and return 
narrative (2011). The return narrative is based on the belief that in the course of its evolution 
feminist theory has lost some of its essential achievements that had been gained at an earlier point 
in time, and because of its diversion from these achievements, the current feminist discourses are 
incapable of addressing pressing socio-political issues at hand. But what has been lost can be 
retrieved and the mistake which diverted the course of feminist theory leading up to the present 
can be rectified. Thus, the return narrative creates a homogeneous history of how feminist theory 
evolved over time and situates various divergent, often discordant, positions within that history by 
ironing out their particularity. Such claims are often made through rhetorical tools instead of 
intense analysis, and the stark absence of references are substituted by generalized propositions. 
New materialism subscribes to the ‘political grammar’ of this return narrative whereby it posits 
itself as the radical force that has set out to retrieve materiality forfeited with the advent of 
cultural/linguistic turn. And as already mentioned, the absence of engagement with the various 
works that they rebuke for their failure to address the question of materiality is characteristic of 
the narrative structure of new materialism. Hemmings writes:       
 
The otherwise striking lack of even general citation in return narratives is, I believe, a 
reflection of their need, and power, to unite the opposed progress and loss narratives of 
Western feminist theory. How much more, then, the danger of introducing reference to 
particular theorists, the meaning of whose work is most certainly not shared or whose 
representative status is contested? [...] the absence of direct citation in return narratives is 
precisely what allows a more elusive citation practice to permeate the glosses. What is cited 
is that common historiography, and its citation—precise in its vagueness—both references 
and produces reflective agreement. (112).  
 
Following this founding gesture, new materialism routinely deprecates cultural constructivism for 
its de facto removal of matter and materiality from the purview of its critical lens and its over-
emphasis on the political economy of signification. It argues that foregrounding the processes of 
‘materialization’11 has rendered matter into a passive and inert entity that is always already 
mediated through language and other cultural apparatuses which endows it with meaning. This is 
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not to claim that the existence of matter is dependent on language, rather it accepts the ontological 
individuality of matter. But addressing this ontological domain is impossible as matter can only be 
accessed as long as it is mediated by language. Therefore, any query regarding materiality is 
structurally compelled to take cultural devices as its primary object of analysis. Consequently, 
matter as such is driven out of the field of critical inquiry. If by political we understand ‘the 
dimension of antagonism constitutive of human societies’ and politics signifies ‘the set of practices 
and institutions through which an order is created, organizing human coexistence in the context of 
conflicturality provided by the political’ (Mouffe 9), then such an understanding of materiality has 
immense implications. These notions of political posit willful subjects as sole agential actors, and 
this introduces a set of problems. In a Cartesian vein, this type of perception of materiality 
reinforces the dualist distinction between language and materiality and other dualist distinctions 
which are associated with and work through this dualist distinction such as nature/culture, 
mind/body etc. The structure of dualist logic is such that it prioritizes one category over the other 
and defines the other category as subordinate, parasitically dependent on the first one. The 
language/matter binarity in discussion attributes secondarity to matter because irrespective of its 
non-linguistic ontological status, its intelligibility is singularly dependent on language. The non-
linguistic ontological structure of matter remains forever inaccessible because it is impossible to 
attain a position outside language which could allow us to explore its constitution before its entry 
into language. Therefore, being inaccessible to all practical purposes, this prelinguistic, primordial 
materiality is analogous to the Kantian notion of the thing-in-itself. In Kant’s conceptualization, 
the thing-in-itself functions as the cause of the world of appearance but remains forever 
inaccessible to the conceptual tools of the phenomenal world.12 There can be no appearance 
without this cause, but this does not mean that the faculty of understanding would allow us to 
approach this primordial domain. It can only be understood as a ‘transcendental object’ which 
causes the phenomenal world to come into being, but maintains an autonomous existence with 
respect to it. We are confined within this world of appearance, passage to the absolute (i.e. 
transcendental) is barred, and the truth of this domain is forever outside our reach (Kant 381). 
Adorno calls this the ‘self reflectivity of reason' - the ability to determine what is unknowable. To 
Adorno, this is an advantage and not a limitation as it allows us to understand what can be known 
and directs our intellectual faculties to that domain instead of indulging in speculative exercise in 
the futile hope of realizing the truth of the absolute (7). Although it is self-evident that the 
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understanding regarding materiality within the linguistic domain is not identical to that of 
noumenon, from a pragmatic perspective a certain parallel can be drawn between the two. Since 
the plane of absolute remains epistemically inaccessible, Kant’s placement of the noumenon as 
unknowable was pragmatic in the sense that by showing what can be known and what cannot it 
established a proper domain of philosophical enquiry. Now, the manner in which linguistic turn 
frames materiality does not ascribe it a transcendental status; neither does it function like ‘cause’, 
nor is it ever claimed that it cannot be affected by culture. According to new materialism, the 
cultural turn argues that even though matter has a primordial existence beyond and before 
language, in itself this materiality is insignificant as it can attain significance only through 
cultural/linguistic interpellation. To sum up, matter in itself, in its primordial prelinguistic form 
can have meaning only within language and culture, and the processes of cultural signification lie 
at the heart of how matter would be interpreted and the value it would carry within the antagonistic 
and hierarchical domain of the political. Hence, any emancipatory narrative would have these 
interpretative grids, processes, and devices of interpellation as its central concern. In this sense, 
the de facto erasure of materiality can be thought of as a pragmatic move, because this effacement 
has political implications.   
As already mentioned, the import of the affective pull13 of the new materialist narrative 
structure lies in its claim to recuperate materiality. New materialism holds that - a) with everything 
being a product of linguistic-cultural investment within the linguistic/representationalist model, 
matter in itself has been effaced from the domain of critical enquiry; b) since cultural investiture 
is paramount for matter to become as such, matter in itself lacks agential capability. Whatever 
agential role it has is imparted by culture - a domain synonymous with willful, conscious human 
subjects and their institutions which endow meaning to the brute world of materiality. Considering 
these two features, it is self-evident that such a position is based on the dualist distinction between 
human (culture) and the nonhuman (inert matter), and being the sole architect able to negotiate the 
significatory grids, human becomes the primary category in its relation with whatever is outside 
their identity. Consequently, new materialism’s call to grasp fully the critical-political charge of 
materiality before and beyond the representationalist schema of language and culture is a move 
beyond the topos of the anthropos. In the light of this discussion, let’s take a brief look at some of 
the new materialist texts. My focus will be solely on understanding in what sense non-humanism 
can be thought of as immanent to new materialism.  
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In 2012, Rick Dolphizn and Iris Van Der Tuin published a collection of interviews of some 
noted new materialists and positional essays on new materialism titled ‘New Materialism: 
Interviews and Cartographies’. In one of these articles, after pointing out the crucial role held by 
nature-culture dualism in western thought and mentioning how instead of working within this 
binary, the aim of new materialism is to understand the way this distinction came into being, 
Dolphizn and Van Der Tuin write::      
 
It [...] gives special attention to matter (materiality, process of materialization) as it has 
been so much neglected by dualist thought. In the same breath we then always already start 
with matter [...] new materialism has been proven to be capable of opposing the 
transcendental and the humanist tradition that are haunting cultural theory, standing on the 
brink of post-postmodern era [...] (94)  
 
In another section, they write: 
      
Cultural theory in the postmodern era has been unable to account fully for materiality, 
whereas it found itself surrounded by an excessive representation [...] of matter [...] in 
popular culture as well as cultural theory. (106)     
                     
In the prefatory address of their volume on new materialism, Diana Coole and Samantha Frost 
chart the trajectories and distinguishing features of the new materialist paradigm (2010). 
Commenting on how theories of cultural constructivism fail to conceptualize materiality 
adequately and in what sense new materialism is radically different from its predecessors, they 
write:      
 
[...] the dominant constructivist orientation to social analysis is inadequate for thinking 
about matter, materiality, and politics in ways that do justice to the contemporary context 
of biopolitics and global political economy. [...] we are also aware that an allergy to ‘‘the 
real’’ that is characteristic of its more linguistic or discursive forms [...] has had the 
consequence of dissuading critical inquirers from the more empirical kinds of investigation 
that material processes and structures require. (6) 
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Highlighting how the linguistic turn functions within a modernist framework and how its 
constructivist approach has eclipsed the domain of materiality, the introductory essay of another 
collection on new materialism reads: 
 
Perhaps due to its centrality in modernist thought, postmoderns are very uncomfortable 
with the concept of the real or the material. [...] postmodernists argue that the real/material 
is entirely constituted by language [...] In their zeal to reject the modernist grounding in the 
material, postmoderns have turned to the discursive pole as the exclusive source of the 
constitution of nature, society, and reality. (Hekman and Alaimo 2-3)  
                          
A comprehensive critical account of new materialism is beyond the scope of our enterprise. But 
these statements capture the common thread running through the otherwise divergent body of work 
that has come to be labelled as new materialism. For new materialism, the linguistic turn has 
thoroughly denaturalized matter/nature. To elaborate, linguisticism’s singular focus on the 
representationalist schema rooted in the ontological separation between materiality/language 
distinction and other associated binaries implies a triadic structure at work. The first component 
of this triad is brute matter, inert, devoid of any agential functions. The second component is the 
buffer zone of culture where an economy of forces interpellates it within its terms. And the third 
component is matter which has now become accessible to us through the interpretative workings 
of cultural devices. In this sense, there is nothing natural about nature and the natural matter since 
what appears as natural is nothing but the production of various discursive apparatuses. This is 
why Kirby calls this ‘second nature’ or ‘second order construct’14 which, contrary to its appearance 
as natural, is unnatural through and through. She writes:   
 
If it is true that we invent a world through a refractive hall of mirrors from which there is 
no escape, no substantive appeal to an extra-linguistic or causal origin, then it makes sense 
to assume that culture’s hermetic self-capture discovers a ‘second nature’ (which is really 
culture in disguise) as the ground and explanation of who we are and how we should live 
[...] according to this view it can have no directly perceived, or substantive facticity because 
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the very act of making sense of a world is necessarily an interpretive makeover. In other 
words, what appears as that which precedes the arrival of the human remains a cultural 
back-projection with no unmediated presence, and this then implies that cultural signs of 
nature overlay a now inaccessible and unknowable nature as such.” (Kirby What If, 3) 
                                                                                           
What causes this transformation that takes inert, non-agential nature as its raw material and moulds 
it into cultural artefacts attributing to it meaning that it lacked before is the domain of the 
anthropos. This is not to say that what Kirby metaphorically calls the ‘first nature’ is incapable of 
change, but whatever alteration it undergoes is merely accidental resulting from various 
interconnected processes. It lacks conscious will and intention which only intentional human actors 
are capable of. Consciousness, intention, agentiality separate  humans from other entities, and 
language being one of the finest manifestations of the ability to think in abstraction becomes 
synonymous with the human - the homo loquens (Kirby Quantum Anthropologies, 40-41). 
Moreover, as language produces matter by rendering it meaningful, any understanding of it within 
this framework would be anthropocentric where humans function as the sole agential actor capable 
of moulding matter (nature). So, considering that there is a prediscursive domain of materiality 
that becomes tangible through its mediation by language; and that language and materiality bear 
two ontologically distinct structures with language being synonymous with humans, new 
materialism’s call to recuperate matter from the depths of language/discourse/culture is by right 
critical of anthropocentrism, and this feature is immanent to its constitution. The question of 
language is particularly significant for new materialism as it continues to reiterate how during the 
linguistic turn only processes of linguistic construction received critical attention and how it 
reduced materiality to language. Consequently, in the radical imperative to move beyond the 
linguisticist paradigm in order to comprehend materiality adequately lies the nonhumanist charge 
of new materialism. 
One of the associated claims of new materialism is its commitment to the univocity of 
being that focuses on how the various dualist distinctions (language/materiality, nature/culture, 
human/nonhuman) fall short in the face of critical scrutiny and how in reality these categories are 
entangled. But our discussion so far provides the ground for speculating whether, in its bid to 
provide a nonhumanist account of materiality, many representatives of new materialism 
inadvertently reinstall language/materiality distinction and other associated dualisms that have 
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hitherto sustained the humanist framework of constructivism. The radicalism of new materialism 
lies in its commitment to understanding materiality beyond a reductive understanding of culture, 
to understand how it informs its representations. But their efforts to refurbish the question of 
materiality operate on humanist accounts of both language and matter. Paradoxically, Kirby’s 
critique of certain proponents of poststructuralism for their lingering commitment to the language-
materiality distinction which new materialists attempt to thwart can be read against various new 
materialist projects themselves:       
 
The abstracting technology of language, intelligence, and creative invention is separated 
from the body of the material world, indeed, from the material body of human animality. 
Ironically, given the initial concern to question the separation of nature from culture within 
Cartesianism, the sense that human identity is somehow secured and enclosed against a 
more primordial and inhuman “outside” (which must include the subject’s own corporeal 
being!) recuperates the Cartesian problematic, but this time without question. (Kirby 
Natural Convers(at)ions, 220-221).  
 
As mentioned, a counterintuitive reading observes that Kirby's critique of the poststructuralist turn 
for its reminiscent Cartesianism that keeps the anthropocentric boundaries of human/nonhuman 
distinction intact despite its claims to the contrary can very well be read as a commentary on the 
new materialist discourse. The Cartesian underpinnings of these new materialist enterprises reveal 
themselves in their literal interpretation of the axiomatic call to eschew anthropocentric principles 
of linguisticism which keeps the categories of language/matter intact, takes language as an 
individual - but not the dominant - compartmentalized component (one albeit associated with 
humans but having an affective role in a limited capacity nonetheless) (in)forming the political, 
and adds 'non-linguistic domain' of matter to that.  
Therefore, being engaged in operating through the categories of language and matter as 
they were advanced within the humanist tradition, it fails to understand how this distinction came 
into being, what was at stake in this differentiating operation, and how the discourse of the 
anthropocene precisely emerges by enacting this distinction. Rather, it ends up translating its 
commitment to nondualism into a simple epistemic critique which argues for rendering the 
contours of language and matter ambiguous without working through the categories themselves. 
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Anirban Das’s insight, albeit in a different yet analogous context of certain section of Western 
feminist theory’s call to move beyond the sex/gender binary by merely blurring the distinction 
between these categories, can be brought to bear on this particular context to argue that an offhand 
rejection of dualist categories through an epistemic critique is not enough because - firstly, this 
rejection of dualism by either opting to think through a monist perspective or blurring of 
boundaries still operates within the broader metabinary of dualism/nondualism; and secondly, and 
more importantly, even when questioning the categories of language, one still has to work through 
it (Das 45-46). It is my contention that the absence of engagement with the terms of the various 
dualist structures that new materialism intends to displace lands a number of new materialist 
ventures under discussion squarely back into the domain of dualism.   
New materialist projects indeed provide new contours for thought and practice. The 
radicalism of its will to address the question of matter, its conceptual arsenal, its affirmative 
approach, focus on concept creation, and its general critical charge undoubtedly has made a lasting 
impression in the humanities. But its nonhumanist inflection and commitment to a nondualist mode 
of thinking remain deeply qualified in that it often finds itself navigating within a dualist, humanist 
tradition which accepts, somewhat uncritically, the categories (i.e., matter, language, human, 
nonhuman) forged within these traditions. To corroborate this, let’s take a      look at one of the 
representatives of the new materialist turn. 
Jane Bennet calls her project ‘Vital materialism’ (2010).  One of the founding dualisms of 
Western intellectual tradition is the separation between conscious, sentient subjects and an inert, 
nonhuman world of brute matter. Lacking any agential role of its own, this nonhuman world 
doesn’t have any significant political purchase and the sole conductor of this field are humans. 
Bennett’s project attempts to argue for a different notion of the political by demonstrating how 
nonhuman bodies also function as agentic actants. It seeks to delineate a different understanding 
of politics by elaborating on the modes of interaction between humans and the nonhumans where 
they exist together in assemblages and instead of being the autonomous, agential character 
ascribing meaning to the nonhuman world through its interpretative ventures, humans are 
presented to be deeply affected by nonhuman bodies. For example, in a chapter dealing with food 
as nonhuman actants, Bennett writes:     
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Food will appear as actant inside and alongside intention-forming, morality-(dis)obeying, 
language-using, reflexivity-wielding, and culture-making human beings, and as an inducer-
producer of salient, public effects. We can call the assemblage formed by these human and 
nonhuman bodies “American consumption” and name as one of its effects the “crisis of 
obesity”  (39).  
 
Though nonhuman actors are here entering the stage of affectivity which had hitherto been 
perceived to be exclusive to humans, Bennett does not question the metaphysical structure that 
informs the formation of these categories. Bennett's political project thus follows an additive 
model, where the nonhumans are merely added to the affective field, but the configuration of these 
categories remain unexamined. Bennett's design follows an interactive model where these 
categories are regarded as self-present, primarily existing individually in space and time, which 
then enter into a relation where both enact on each other (Bennett Force of Things, 4). In a previous 
article, where she called her project ‘thing-power materialism’, Bennett writes::      
 
Thing-power materialism is a speculative onto-story, a rather presumptuous attempt to 
depict the nonhumanity that flows around but also through humans [...] Thing-power 
materialism figures materiality as a protean flow of matter-energy and figures the thing as 
a relatively composed form of that flow. It hazards an account of materiality even though 
materiality is both too alien and too close for humans to see clearly. It seeks to promote 
acknowledgement, respect, and sometimes fear of the materiality of the thing and to 
articulate ways in which human being and thinghood overlap. (Force of Things 349). 
 
In the light of our discussion, the implications of these statements are self-evident. Various other 
representatives of new materialism share a similar structure that introduces nonhuman actors but 
doesn’t interrogate the constitution upon which the separation of the two and devaluation of 
nonhuman came into being. Rather, following an additive model similar to the one espoused by 
Bennett, it perceives the political to be an aggregate of these categories that are ontologically 
distinct and mutually exclusive in space and time. Susan Hekman’s ‘mangle’ (2010), Nancy 
Tuana’s ‘viscous porosity’ (2008), Braidotti’s ‘matter-realism’ (2012), to name a few, share this 
same trait. But does this mean that any effort to destabilize these binaries and advance a theory of 
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materiality beyond the topos of the human is always already compromised by the spectre of 
anthropocentrism? Is any discussion of language bound to be located within the domain of the 
anthropos? Are new materialist efforts to circumvent language/materiality distinction structurally 
compromised from within?  
 
Outline for a Radical Nonhumanism 
 
The problematic feature manifest in a significant amount of new materialist scholarship, as 
elaborated in the previous section, is that even though it proposes to redress the question of matter 
by eschewing the all-encompassing notions of language and discourse, it does not question what 
language is or what defines matter as such. These endeavours take these operational categories as 
they were designed within the humanist tradition where language was primarily a mode of 
communication between individual agents. For example, let’s take a look at a brief excerpt from 
the writings of Wilhelm Von Humboldt, one of the pioneers of modern linguistics:      
 
The bringing-forth of language is an inner need of human beings, not merely an external 
necessity for maintaining communal intercourse, but a thing lying in their own nature, 
indispensable for the development of their mental powers and the attainment of a 
worldview, to which man can attain only by bringing his thinking to clarity and precision 
through communal thinking with others. (27) 
 
And that this communicative model was unquestioningly presupposed by various new materialist 
enterprises becomes evident in the way they take language as the meaning-making function 
through which human subjects make sense of the outside world (Bennett Vibrant Matter, 39). This 
in turn guides the renewed quest for matter and materiality in new materialism to seek the real, 
matter-in-itself by eschewing language in the hope that this would usher them into a truly original 
understanding of the material domain. Therefore, what we observe here is a simple repudiation of 
language instead of working through it, questioning its basis which secures its boundaries and 
keeps it neatly confined within the locus of the anthropos. 
Focusing on the works of Vicki Kirby, a thinker associated with new materialist 
scholarship, this section would provide an outline of how an unorthodox reworking of 
Sanglap: Journal of Literary and Cultural Inquiry 8.1 (Dec 2021) 
 119 
language/materiality binary can be possible from within the new materialist premises that unsettles 
the constitution of this binary by displacing the constitutive conditions of language which defines 
it is as the exclusive habitat of anthropos. Such a manoeuvre unmoors language from its ascribed 
position within the humanist tradition and argues that language has never been about humans. Such 
a gesture renders the dualist schema of language/materiality unsustainable to the extent that any 
originary separation of the two becomes impossible. As within the metaphysical tradition language 
is the definitive marker of the anthropos and since its absence is synonymous with the inarticulate 
domain of brute matter (nature, world), disarticulating this binary disrupts the hitherto secure 
boundary, distinguishing human from the nonhuman such that a definitive break between the two 
becomes untenable. This aspect of Kirby’s work I call ‘radical nonhumanism’. Since the space of 
this article will not permit a comprehensive discussion of her work, I would start from Kirby's 
polemical engagement with Judith Butler's theory of materiality to understand the unorthodox 
nature of her conceptualization of language15 which provides the basis of this radical non-
humanism.  
Judith Butler’s conceptualisation of materiality is based on a performative account that 
attempts to elaborate how the appearance of matter (nature) as the ‘irreducible’ referent is the result 
of its being posited as such within language (Butler Bodies That Matter, 28). Since matter's 
appearance as prediscursive is the product of language, there can be no access to this primordial 
ground of materiality. Language and materiality are embedded such that the possibility of a pure, 
prelinguistic exterior is forever foreclosed. The import of Kirby’s notion of language emerges 
succinctly in her critical scrutiny of Butler’s theory of materialization. Butler’s account, Kirby 
contends, proves problematic on two interlinked grounds. First, even though Butler argues for the 
embeddedness of the two, it doesn’t deny the existence of an extralinguistic sphere that remains 
inaccessible to language, which in turn, surreptitiously institutes an absolute split between these 
two domains (Kirby Live theory, 69). Second, for Butler, ‘materialization’, the affective processes 
of the linguistic and the discursive which produce matter as such within its terms, remains tied to 
human exceptionalism in the sense that it locates culture and language as exclusive to humans. 
Citing Butler's response to Kirby's question in one of the interviews she took of her, Kirby writes:      
      
Butler presumes that signs of thinking, whether models, representations, symbols, or the 
corollary social behaviours through which they are made manifest, are evidence of specific, 
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human, cultural capacities. Indeed, these signs are enclosed in a self-referential system 
whose complex meld of intransigence and change is the very stuff of political life. 
Importantly for Butler, these signs and models, these conceptualisations and curiosities, 
cannot be biological in nature. (Kirby Subject to, 10)  
 
Therefore, Butler’s endeavour, despite its wish to the contrary, sticks to the fundamental tenets of 
constructivism that discounts materiality by reducing it to anthropogenic practices of the language 
and discourse. It is against this backdrop that Kirby, following Derrida, introduces the concept of 
general writing that radically reorients its previous constitution where it always figured as opposed 
to and excluded from the realm of the anthropos.  
The concept of general writing or language in general sense cannot be thought of as a 
cultural/ linguistic mediation where matter is posited as the radical exterior that can only be 
accessed through language but which can never be fully exhausted within it (Kirby Quantum 
Anthropologies, 13). Rather, in a Derridean vein, language needs to be approached in terms of the 
logic of supplement. The concept of supplement has been elaborately discussed in a number of his 
early works.16 Within the logic of supplement, the primordial lack17 of nature is filled by the 
institution of supplement that emerges from within. It works by a dual logic, on the one hand, it 
adds something to the existing field and in this sense it functions like a surplus; on the other hand, 
it substitutes something, and these two aspects function together. But what it substitutes has always 
already been absent, and it is this originary absence that is supplemented through the institution of 
supplement. Therefore, it cannot be said that supplement takes the place of a prior presence 
(Derrida Of Grammatology, 144-45). Keeping in mind Derrida’s reading of Rousseau’s text 
through the (non) concept of supplement, if fulfilment of the originary absence through supplement 
is how the ‘origin’ is established as such, then we must contend that supplement is integral to this 
‘origin’, and that both the origin and the primordial lack we mentioned earlier is conceivable only 
through the institution of supplement. As Derrida puts it in the context of Rousseau’s obsessive 
enterprise on the purity of nature that ‘The supplement to Nature is within Nature as its play’ 
(Derrida Of Grammatology, 258). In this sense, supplement is a different manifestation of nature 
itself.  Language or writing in general sense, thought through the logic of supplement, therefore 
does not exist in a relation of exteriority that acts on nature (matter) from outside.   
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The concept of general writing spans across Kirby’s entire oeuvre. While within the 
constructivist framework language, understood in the restricted sense of the term, always figures 
within an oppositional relation with matter, the framework of ‘language in general sense’ (also 
called ‘general text’18) as discussed above circumvents this split, but not by rejecting the categories 
altogether or enacting a reversal like a significant amount of new materialist scholarship discussed 
in the previous section do. Instead, within the conceptual framework of general writing, difference 
is not dependent on the outside, but it is a movement from which the inside-outside distinction 
proceeds, it is the general structure of becoming. Therefore, any ontological split between these 
categories which in the constructivist framework find itself mired in oppositional logic, becomes 
unsustainable.  
Kirby reads Derrida’s notion of the general text within the contentious domain of 
materiality and explicates it as ‘Entanglement of systemic energies’ (Quantum Anthropologies           
55), ‘Systemic complexity’ (Human exceptionalism 54), ‘inclusive systematicity’ (Quantum 
Anthropologies 59) where signification or interpretation does not stand exclusively outside the 
domain of matter, but rather is a manifestation of the system itself that functions through the logic 
of supplement. The system itself functions in an aporetic manner that does not allow any 
ontological split between categories, rather they are manifestations of the complex functions of the 
system of which these categories (language, matter) are ‘differant expressions’. Kirby writes:       
 
[a]ny “unit” is not so much a separate part of a larger whole to which it remains indebted, 
but rather a unique instantiation of the system’s own reinvention (or rewriting) of itself. 
Thus, every “instance” is “the whole,” and this imploded, holographic sense of identity 
confounds linearity as an unfolding sequence of separate, successive moments.      
(Quantum Anthropologies 55)   
 
Language is not a medium, it does not interpret a primary presence (nature, matter) situated beyond 
language. Language does not come after nature, rather it is ‘originary’ in the sense that it produces 
the (non) origin precisely by supplementing it. The supplement-origin relation doesn’t function in 
a binary mode where the two separate and self-present entities enter into a relation, rather the 
difference between them comes into being only after the advent of supplement. Read into the 
context of the new materialist framework, the radical import of this conceptual formation becomes 
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evident, and one of the major contributions of Kirby is to bring the conceptual framework of 
general text within the contested site of materiality. Even though this possibility was already 
present in Derrida’s postulations of textuality, this was never fully explored as deconstruction was 
thought to have a limited purchase, significant only as a tool for semantic analysis. Kirby’s 
unorthodox approach introduced the question of language within the discussion of the ontological 
structure of being which provocatively manifests itself in her rephrasing of the much-cited maxim 
associated with Derrida that ‘there is no outside text’ as ‘there is no outside nature’ since whatever 
supplements nature is a play of nature itself. Therefore, the distinction between nature and culture 
doesn’t hold any significance for Kirby, neither is she troubled by the need to eschew language in 
order to recuperate the question of matter (nature). Rather, as supplement, as a differant expression, 
culture is always already with/in nature. In this sense representation, interpretation, meaning-
making - in short, processes associated with the domain of culture - is auto affectivity of nature 
itself (Quantum Anthropologies 36). It does not require a human agent to read it, provide it with 
interpretation. But language/culture is the very stuff of nature itself and such an orientation 
displaces its position of synonimity with humans which secured the boundary distinguishing them 
from the nonhumans who were devoid of language. Kirby writes:      
 
Not many would dispute the presence of a biological reality that is quite different from 
culture and that we imperfectly try to comprehend. But surely, if we were without our skin 
and we could witness the body’s otherwise invisible processes as we chat to each other, 
read a presentation aloud, type away at our computers, or negotiate an intense exchange 
with someone we care about, we might be forced to acknowledge that perhaps the meat of 
the body is thinking material. If it is in the nature of biology to be cultural—and clearly, 
what we mean by “cultural” is intelligent, capable of interpreting, analyzing, reflecting, 
and creatively reinventing—then what is this need to exclude such processes of 
interrogation from the ontology of life?  (Natural Convers(at)ions 221; emphasis mine). 
 
Kirby's nonhumanism isn’t exhausted within the additive framework where the nonhuman world 
(matter, nature) is attributed affectivity and as an actant added to the domain of the political. The 
novelty of Kirby’s approach lies in its reworking of these operational concepts that pushes those 
concepts to their limit, such that any separability between them becomes impossible. In our 
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discussion of various new materialist projects, we observed how their literal interpretation of the 
new materialist call to eschew the dominance of language ended up reinforcing the humanist 
understanding of both language and matter. Within this understanding, the necessary task of 
questioning the humanist configuration of language remained absent. Instead, the call to move 
beyond linguisticism often resulted in merely extending the communicative notions of language 
to nonhumans which de facto reinstalled the human/nonhuman, language/matter dualism which it 
had set out to debunk. But the significance of Kirby’s project lies precisely in displacing the 
humanist configuration of these operative categories by introducing the concept of general writing. 
Language, unmoored from its humanist constitution and understood as the general structure of the 
world collapses the metaphysical distinction between human/nonhuman or nature/culture from 
within and opens up the possibility for conceiving these categories differant-ly. And this, I submit, 





1.  See Coole & Frost 2010; Alaimo & Hekman 2008; Dolphizn & Van Der Tuin 2012; Pitts-Taylor 2016; Ellenzweig 
& Zammito 2017. 
2.  See Barad 2007; Grosz 2011. 
3.  See Coole & Frost 2010; Alaimo & Hekman 2008; Dolphizn & Van Der Tuin 2012; Pitts-Taylor 2016; Ellenzweig 
& Zammito 2017; Braidotti 2012. 
4.  Alaimo & Hekman 2010. 
5.  Coole & Frost 2008; Ellenzweig 2017. But contrary to the general new materialist claim that within the previous 
materialist settlements matter was conceived as passive, it has been asserted that such a generalized picture of old 
materialist traditions might not be accurate (Wilson 125). 
6.  Coole & Frost 2010. 
7.  Alaimo & Hekman 2008. 
8.  Originating in Merleau-Ponty’s work, this concept has often been used approvingly by new materialists (Kirby 
Quantum Anthropologies, 112-36). Also, see Kirby 2009; Tuana 2008. 
9.  We will discuss this in detail while analyzing a number of pioneering new materialist texts later in this article. 
10.  Discussed later in this section. Nikki Sullivan in her article also expressed her vexation at the uncorroborated 
reiteration by new materialists as to how positions associated with the cultural turn ignored the question of matter 
(2012). 
11.  Butler 1993, 9. 
12.  Kant 1998, 381. 
13.  Hemmings 2011. 
14.  See Kirby 2016. 
15.  This, in turn, has immense implications for the question of materiality. 
16.  Derrida 1976. 
17.  I am calling this ‘primordial lack’ in a provisional sense. Provisional because the textual economy of  Derrida’s 
reading of Rousseau’s texts where the (non)concept of supplement emerged, doesn’t allow us to think of this 
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primordiality in terms of full presence because of two reasons. Primordial lack signifies an absolute absence perceived 
in terms of a negative mode of being, something that is not there, something that is not present. Lack therefore is the 
presence of an absolute absence within the origin. But Derrida’s notion of supplement does not merely fulfill a prior 
non-presence, on the contrary this idea of a primordial lack is possible only after the advent of supplement which 
produces the origin, without/before supplement there cannot be an origin as such. Origin, to put in a Derridian vein, 
is a function of supplement. And since supplement produces the ‘origin;’ and yet at the same time is the result of this 
‘lack’ which can only come after the origin, supplement has to be considered as something that can neither be an 
absolute outside (of the origin, nature), nor can it be identical to the inside. 
18.  Derrida 2020 
 
      
      
Works Cited 
Adorno, Theodor W. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001. 
Print. 
Alaimo, Stacy, and Susan J. Hekman. Material Feminisms. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2008. Print. 
Barad, Karen. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter 
and Meaning. Durham: Duke UP, 2007. Print. 
----- "Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter." 
Material Feminisms. Ed. Susan Hekman and Stacy Alaimo.Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2008.  Pp 120-54. 
Bennett, Jane. "The Force of Things: Steps Toward an Ecology of Matter." Political Theory 32.3 
(2004): pp. 347-72. Print. 
-----Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010. Print. 
Braidotti, Rosi. Nomadic Theory: The Portable Rosi Braidotti. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2012. Print. 
Burnwell, Ashley. "Method Matters: The Ethics of Exclusion." What If Culture Was Nature All 
Along? Ed. Vicki Kirby. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017.Print. Pp. 26-47. 
Sanglap: Journal of Literary and Cultural Inquiry 8.1 (Dec 2021) 
 125 
Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex. London and New York: 
Routledge, 1993. Print. 
----- Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. London and New York: Taylor 
and Francis, 2006. Print. 
Colebrook, Claire. "Post-Human Humanities." Time and History in Deleuze and Serres. Ed. Bernd 
Herzogenrath. Bloomsbury Academic, 2012. Print. Pp. 103-25. 
Coole, Diana and Samantha Frost. New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics. Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2010. Print. 
Das, Anirban. Toward a Politics of the (Im)possible: The Body in Third World Feminisms. London: 
Anthem, 2010. Print. 
Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1976. Print. 
----- Life Death. Chicago: University of Chicago, 2020. Print. 
Dolphijn, Rick and Iris van der Tuin. New Materialism: Interviews and Cartographies. Ann Arbor: 
Open Humanities, 2012. Print. 
Grosz, Elisabeth A. Becoming Undone: Darwinian Reflections on Life, Politics, and Art. Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2011. Print. 
Hekman, Susan J. The Material of Knowledge: Feminist Disclosures. Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010. Print. 
Hemmings, Clare. Why Stories Matter: The Political Grammar of Feminist Theory. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2011. Print. 
Humboldt, Wilhelm Von. On Language: The Diversity of the Human Language Structure and Its 
Influence on the Mental Development of Mankind. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988. Print. 
Sanglap: Journal of Literary and Cultural Inquiry 8.1 (Dec 2021) 
 126 
Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Print. 
Kirby, Vicki. "Grammatology: A Vital Science." Derrida Today 9.1 (2016): pp. 47-67. Print. 
----- "Human Exceptionalism on the Line." SubStance 43.2 (2014): pp. 50-67. Print. 
----- Judith Butler: Live Theory. London: Continuum, 2006. Print. 
----- "Natural Convers(at)ions: Or, What If Culture Was Really Nature All Along?" Material    
Feminisms. Ed. Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2008. Print. 
Pp 214-36. 
-----"Subject to Natural Law." Australian Feminist Studies 23.55 (2008): pp. 5-17. Print. 
-----What If Culture Was Nature All Along? Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017. Print. 
Lemke, Thomas. "Matter and Mater: A Preliminary Cartography of Material Feminisms." Soft Power 
5.1 (2017): pp. 83-99. Print. 
Mouffe, Chantal. On the Political. London and New York: Routledge, 2005. Print. 
Pitts-Taylor, Victoria. Mattering: Feminism, Science, and Materialism. New York: New York 
University Press, 2016. Print. 
Sullivan, Nikki. "The Somatechnics of Perception and the Matter of the Non/human: A Critical 
Response to the New Materialism." European Journal of Women's Studies 19.3 (2012): pp. 
299-313. Print. 
Tuana, Nancy, and Susan Hekman. "Viscous Porosity: Witnessing Katrina." Material Feminisms. Ed. 
Stacy Alaimo. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2008. Print. Pp. 188-213. 
Wilson, Catherine. "Materialism, Old and New, and the Party of Humanity." The New Politics of 
Materialism; History, Philosophy, Science. Ed/ Sarah Ellenzweig and John H. Zammito. 
London and New York: Routledge, 2017. Print. Pp. 111-30 
Sanglap: Journal of Literary and Cultural Inquiry 8.1 (Dec 2021) 
 127 
Zammito, John H, and Sarah Ellenzweig. The New Politics of Materialism: History, Philosophy, 

















Senior Research Fellow, School of Women’s Studies 
Jadavpur University, Kolkata 
sanmitchatterjee@gmail.com 
© Sanmit Chatterjee, 2021 
 
 
